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This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interests on strategic communication
when the sender has lying costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such
disclosure often leads to more informative, but at the same time also to more biased messages.
This benefits rational receivers while it exerts a negative externality from them on naive or
delegating receivers; disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify
general conditions of the information structure under which this effect manifests and show
that whenever it does, full disclosure is socially inefficient. The results hold independently of
the degree of receivers’ risk-aversion and for arbitrary precision of the disclosure statement.
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1 Introduction
A substantial part of the world’s economic activity deals with the elicitation of information by
experts and its communication to non-experts. Examples include stock analysts, researchers,
consultants or managers reporting to shareholders. Too often, experts face a conflict of interests
(henceforth COI) such as sale commissions or affiliations which make their reports prone to be
biased. Inefficiencies then arise because of two main reasons: First, receivers of such information
may ignore the expert’s COI and make poor choices by following biased information. Second,
receivers lack information about the COI, e.g. its relative magnitude and the direction of the
bias it induces. Without such information, they cannot accurately correct the expert’s advice.
They may then rationally decide to ignore the expert’s message, at least partially, such that
valuable information is lost. Disclosure of COIs promises to be a simple remedy to this problem.
The idea is that information about the expert’s COI helps at least those receivers who can use it
to correct for a potential bias. It is also tempting to policy makers as it carries the, as I will show
incorrect, intuition that flattening information asymmetries is always desirable and should at
least not hurt anyone. From a regulatory view, disclosure is also an appealing option as it is less
paternalistic and less costly to regulators than direct supervision and regulation.1 A prominent
example for such a policy is contained in the Sarbanes-Oxlay-Act which was enacted in 2002 as
a response to prior corporate frauds, in particular among financial analysts. Among its adopted
regulations is the requirement to "[...]disclose in each research report, as applicable, conflicts of
interest that are known or should have been known by the securities analysts[...]" United States
Congress (2002, Sec. 501b).
The objective of this paper is to describe an economic mechanism which shows how and
why such disclosure often can lead to consequences opposite to those intended. It does so by
considering a communication game in which both, the superior information an expert owns and
the COI he faces are his private type. The model allows some receivers to be naive with regard
to the sender’s COI while others are fully rational, in a Bayesian sense. Alternatively, naivety
in this setup is equivalent to delegation of decision to an expert, e.g. to a managed fund. The
combination of these factors then unveils a simple channel under which disclosure can lead to
more biased information transmission which hurts the naive receivers of expert information who
do not anticipate the strategic effects of disclosure.
In a work which examines the communication by financial analysts, Malmendier and Shan-
thikumar (2014) show that they strategically inflate their stock recommendations and are not
1Fung et al. (2007) lists further reasons for why disclosure regulations seem appealing, numerous specific
examples, and also examples for their failure.
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just overly optimistic, a feature which is maintained in the analysis of this paper. To do so,
they use data on analyst recommendations which covers a period before and after the Sarbanes-
Oxlay-Act. Their analysis shows that the strategic bias did not disappear after the act was put
into action.2 Similarly, Mullainathan et al. (2012) conducted an audit study and show that in
period after the act came into effect, financial advice has remained of poor quality. Clean, causal
evidence for negative effects of disclosure comes from Cain et al. (2005): In their experiment,
subjects in the role of an experts had ample opportunities to study a jar filled with coins. These
subjects then advised others who had to estimate the amount of money inside the jar but could
not examine it before-hand. Their paper first confirms the straightforward intuition that when
the experts’ pay is based on the final estimate’s accuracy, the advice and estimates are better
than when the experts are paid based on how high estimates are. They however also show that
when receivers are made aware of the experts’ incentive to induce a high estimate, the experts’
bias increases. On average, receivers do not account for this effect and end up making worse
decisions than without disclosure. This finding on the adverse effects of disclosure have also
been replicated in similiar setups by Koch and Schmidt (2010), Inderst et al. (2010), and Cain
et al. (2011).3 The effect identified here is in line with these observations.
To understand the source of this adverse effect, consider an analyst ("he") who knows a
share’s fundamental value. When sending a message about it, he faces a COI to overstate it, such
as through a sales commission. Suppose also he faces lying costs of doing so, e.g. reputational
and/or expected legal costs. The magnitude of the bias in his message is then determined by
equalizing the marginal costs of lying to the marginal return of doing so. The latter is given by
the commission weighted with the average marginal reaction receivers to the sender’s message.
Now regard a client ("she") who receives a message from the sender and is aware of the bias. She
can try to de-bias it by correcting for the expected bias. However, since she faces uncertainty
regarding the commission’s actual size or even its direction, she can even worsen the outcome by
such de-biasing when the actual bias differs from the expected one. Facing such a strategic risk,
rational receivers of biased messages will the form their estimate of the actual state of the world
as a combination between the imperfectly de-biased message and her prior about the state of the
world. For this estimate, the weight which a rational receivers puts on the sender’s imperfectly
de-biased message is inversely related to the strategic uncertainty regarding the sender’s COI.
Disclosing the COI then decreases this strategic uncertainty and often leads rational receivers
2See Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014), p.1298: They state that their measure of strategic bias remains
sizable and positive for affiliated analysts when they split the sample by August 2001, the date when the scandals
became public and which contributed to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxlay-Act less than a year later.
3For a further review on the failure of disclosure and psychological approaches to these findings, see Loewen-
stein et al. (2014).
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to put more weight on the sender’s message after de-biasing it. However, this translates into
a larger marginal reaction to the sender’s message. As explained above, this marginal reaction
of receivers scales the sender’s bias; it is therefore increased by disclosure. Delegating or naive
receivers who do not account for the strategic effects of biasing and de-biasing communication
are then hurt by this increase.
The above reasoning combines two main insights: First, the reaction to the sender’s message
by rational, risk-averse receivers depends on the quality of information they can extract from
it. Second, an expert who faces a COI and has lying costs biases his message in proportion to
the reaction it induces. Both of these effects are simple in their economic intuition. Combined
however, they deliver the surprising result that increasing transparency can be a bad idea when
the disclosed information is not used by everyone. In particular, it proves the idea that disclosing
COIs is a Pareto-improvement among receivers to be wrong when not all of them are fully
rational. Accordingly, disclosure can also lead to less efficiency, depending on the relative share
of receiver types.
In this paper, I model the above effect in a framework which allows for arbitrary degrees of
risk-aversion as well as arbitrary quality of the disclosure process. I identifies general conditions
under which this effect manifests and thereby allows to evaluate the welfare consequences of
disclosure. The key variable to identify the consequences of disclosure is the correlation between
the expert’s COI and the information on which he has superior knowledge. For example, when-
ever this correlation is at weakly positive disclosure backfires. It is also shown that in all these
settings, full disclosure is never optimal from an social efficiency point of view. I also show that
there can be situations in which disclosure is a Pareto-improvement among all receivers and that
only in these cases, full disclosure is efficient.
Related literature: By analyzing the consequences of disclosing an expert’s COI, this paper
contributes to the literature on strategic communication. In their seminal work on the topic,
Crawford and Sobel (1982) characterize communication equilibria to be partitional: In equilib-
rium, the sender endogenously partitions the state space and announces a message which maps
to the partition which contains the actual state of the world. The lower the number of partitions
in equilibrium, the greater is the loss in informativeness of his message. This result applies inde-
pendent of the specific the meaning of language, i.e. how, in equilibrium, states map to messages
by the sender and back from messages into actions by receivers.4 As this is an equilibrium fea-
ture, it is therefore implicitly assumed that, whatever it is exactly, such a meaning of language
4See Sobel (2013) for an overview of the rich literature which has utilized and extended the partitioning result.
Also see the section on pragmatics therein for further discussion an what language and its meaning actually are
in the context of strategic communication.
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is common knowledge. In the example of a financial analysts who announces "I expect share X
will pay Y this year" many people would understand its meaning to be literal, thus that X is
the share’s actual performance or at least the analyst’s best estimate. This is also the implicit
assumption of studies which investigate the bias of financial analysts and which allows them
to conclude that their messages are upward biased (Hayes, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999;
Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2014). However, the partitioning result in combination with
such a literal meaning (and understanding) of language implies that, on average, the message
and the realized state of the world should not differ.
To reconcile a literal meaning of messages and biased messages, one or both of the two crucial
assumptions which underlie this result therefore need to be changed. Addressing them, Kartik
et al. (2007) and Kartik (2009) show respectively that these assumptions are the boundedness
of the state space and cheap talk, i.e. no costs of lying.5 Capturing these insights, this paper
allows for an unbounded support, for example when the variable on which the sender has private
information is normally distributed. It also allows for lying costs. Similar to those used by Kartik
(2009) these costs penalize messages which differ from the state of the world, they thus capture
a literal interpretation of language as in the above example with a financial analyst. This allows
to meaningfully define a sender’s bias as the deviation from his message to the true state of the
world. Also, it reflects the norm that communication should be as honest and a straightforward
as possible, in particular that language should not be inflated. This in turn justifies the behavior
of naive receivers who trust the sender by choosing their action based on his message’s face value.
Crucially, and in contrast to the above works, I do not assume that the sender’s COI is
common knowledge. It therefore also adds to the literature on strategic communication with
strategic uncertainty. Morgan and Stocken (2003) consider cheap talk with a compact state space
when the sender’s privately known COI is represented by a binary variable which is independent
of the state of the world. In this setup, they find that the sender’s messaging strategy remains
partitional.6 Close to the focus of this work is Li and Madarasz (2008) as they explicitly consider
the consequences of decreasing strategic uncertainty. The sender’s COI is again assumed to be
binary and independent of a uniformly distributed state of the world. Since talk is also assumed
to be cheap, i.e. there are no lying costs, equilibria remain partitional. They show that disclosure
5Kartik et al. (2007) show that under general conditions, unbounded support is sufficient for the sender’s
messaging strategy to be continuous and (upward) biased. Kartik (2009) considers the case when the state space
is compact but the sender has lying costs. He shows that equilibria are partially separating of the "LSHP (low
types separate and high types pool)"-form: When the sender is upward-biased, he exaggerates his statement by
a fixed bias if the state is below a certain threshold. If it is above that threshold, the sender only announces the
partition of the upper subset of the state space in which the true state lies.
6In the theoretical part of his work, Blanes i Vidal (2003) also considers a binary COI which is independent
of a normally distributed state of the world. He finds that receivers can never react to the sender’s message in
every state of the world. However, under a variety of parameter conditions issues of equilibrium non-existence
arise.
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can decrease informational efficiency, thus the number of partitions. The reason for this is that
the sender’s COI is assumed to have an expected value of zero; without disclosure it is thus
only strategic uncertainty, not an expected bias, which complicates communication. They then
show that common knowledge of the COI’s realized, non-zero value through disclosure turns out
to be a greater impediment to efficient communication than expecting it to be zero. Inderst
and Ottaviani (2012) is the second related paper which studies explicitly the consequences of
lowering strategic uncertainty, here in the context of advice-giving for product choices. They
model the origin of the sender’s COI as commissions paid by the products’ producers to experts
who in turn advise customers on which of two competing products suits them best – the state
of the world and the expert’s message are therefore binary. Their results show that disclosing
COIs reduces the provision of commissions but less so in relative terms for the inferior product.
Consequently, the relative bias rises upon disclosure and consumers make worse decisions.
This paper’s framework describes strategic communication when both, the state of the world
and the sender’s COI are represented by continuous, possibly correlated, variables and when
the sender has costs of lying. This is different from the above approaches and crucial for the
mechanism which underlies the adverse effect of disclosure. It derives from linking the larger
reaction to a biased message after disclosure to the sender’s endogenous choice of the bias
which. For this, lying costs are an essential feature. The model’s specific form extends a linear-
quadratic-normal framework as used by Fischer and Verrecchia (2000). They consider a manager
who announces the earnings of the company, a setting which is also admissible here among
others. It extends it to elliptical distributions as recently used by Deimen and Szalay (2014) who
study strategic communication when players cannot agree on the relative importance of different
information they hold.7 Within this wider class of models it is the first to focus on disclosure
of COIs. To do so, it extends the analysis of communication games in this class along three
main dimensions: First, it examines not only the informational content of the sender’s message
but also his bias – the deviation from a honest, literally meant message. This is important for
studying the consequences on receivers, especially those who are strategically unsophisticated.
Modeling such naive receivers and their strategic effect on the sender’s messaging strategy allows
to clearly identify the negative consequences of disclosure. Second, and in contrast to the
preceding literature, this work also studies explicitly the role of negative correlation between the
variables of interest, here the sender’s COI and the state of the world. Apart from analyzing
the resulting equilibria more generally, it is shown that only with such a negative correlation,
7Kartik and Frankel (2016) recently adapted this approach to study more broadly the consequences of stake
sizes on the informativeness of one-dimensional signaling for two-dimensional types. It also allow naive receivers.
Technically also related, Bénabou and Tirole (2006) study signaling of pro-social motivation within the linear-
quadratic framework and jointly normally distributed variables.
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disclosure of COIs can improve welfare for both, rational and naive receivers. Third, I explicitely
model disclosure of COIs through a signal of arbitrary precision. Just performing comparative
statics with respect to a single parameter, i.e. the variance which describes uncertainty for the
sender’s COI, overlooks the, potentially opposing, effect of disclosure on correlated variables. In
contrast, the approach presented here allows to analyze the effects of disclosure on the whole
posterior distribution of beliefs.
The next section outlines the model’s structure and evaluates the assumptions made with respect
to several settings of expert advice. In Section 3, I derive the equilibrium behavior of senders and
receivers when the sender’s COI is undisclosed. Section 4 covers the case of disclosure. Section
5 synthesizes the preceding analysis and assesses the consequences of disclosure on receivers and
overall efficiency. Section 6 concludes by summarizing the main insights and discussing their
policy implications.
2 The model
Consider a mass of non-experts, henceforth called receivers. Every receiver would like to know
the state of the world denoted by the random variable s ∈ S ⊆ R, because she has to take a
decision d ∈ S whose return is dependent on the realization of s. For example, s might represent
an asset’s return and d the receiver’s optimal position into this asset. Consequently, the receiver
suffers a loss which is the greater, the more her decision and the actual state of the world are
misaligned. To capture this, assume that a receiver’s ex-post utility, given her decision d and
the state of the world s, can be represented as
uR(d; s) = L(d− s) (1)
where L is a univariate, C2 loss function which is strictly concave and symmetric around its
maximum. Without loss of generality I assume L(0) = 0. As the leading example, consider
L(d− s) = −12(d− s)2, the quadratic loss function.8
Receivers do not know s and therefore refer to a risk-neutral sender who knows its value.
The sender communicates via a public message m ∈M = S about s. In doing so, he faces costs
of lying which are captured by a C2, strictly concave loss function K : M ×S → R− with image
K(m; s) ∈ R. This image is uniquely maximized at m = s, reflecting that the meaning of the
8This is the canonical example put forward by Crawford and Sobel (1982) and used in much of the literature
on strategic communication. Ottaviani (2000) shows that this specific function covers the case of a receiver with
exponential utility who makes an investment d into a risky asset of which he knows its variance but not its
expected value s.
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message is assumed to be literal. This cost of lying may stem from different sources, including
the expected legal costs of being captured lying, reputational concerns, or moral considerations.9
If the above were the sender’s only strategic incentive he would be honest and always send
m = s. Receivers would then just follow the message and implement their optimal choice.
However, such strong influence of the sender on the receivers’ decisions can be exploited. The
sender can be paid to induce either a high or low decision among receivers, e.g. via sales
commissions. To see how such a COI creates a bias consider the aggregate decision of receivers,
e.g. expected aggregate demand, which the sender can possibly influence with his message and
denote it by D(m).10 The COI of the sender is then denoted by a variable c ∈ C ⊆ R. It
scales in proportion to the aggregate decision he can influence. The sender then has to choose
a message m ∈M which maximizes the following expected utility function:
E[uS(m; s, c)] = cD(m) +K(m; s) (2)
Note that for a (temporarily) fixed supply, shifting demand also implies a shift in price.
By appropriate scaling of c, this allows to capture situations where the sender’s COI lies in
eventually influencing prices, as in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000). Also note that the commission
is proportional to the demand. This differs from other approaches which assume that the receiver
and sender have the same concave utility functions which only differ in their bliss points. In
particular, such approaches assume that the sender’s utility decreases the more the more the
receiver’s action differs in either direction from the sender’s bliss point.11 For the example used
previously, this would mean that a financial analyst facing sales commissions would try to induce
a specific demand up to that bliss point but not more. In contrast, the assumption here is that
a COI induces the sender to shift demand as much as possible, subject to the costs of lying and
the loss of credulity due to his resulting bias. More exactly, when D(m) is differentiable, the
sender’s optimal message m∗ has to solve the following first-order condition:
cD′(m) = −∂K(m; s)
∂m
(3)
As a direct consequence, there is no truth-telling when there is a COI and receivers react to the
9For a rationale of reputational costs, see Sobel (1985) and Morris (2001). Evidence that many people have
a preference for being honest per se is provided, among others, in Erat and Gneezy (2012), López-Pérez and
Spiegelman (2012), and Abeler et al. (2014).
10For example, when there is a continuum of receivers with mass one, each receiver indexed by i and having
demand di(m), then D(m) = E[di(m)].
11In the framework of this paper, this would be uS(d, s, b) = L (d− (s+ b)) +K(m; s) with b 6= 0. In such a
setting, naive receivers who follow the sender’s message naively, i.e. implement it as their action, create costs to
the sender (see Ottaviani and Squintani, 2006; Kartik et al., 2007).
7
sender, thus when cD′(m) 6= 0 holds. Furthermore, by concavity of K(m, s) in m around s, the
larger the magnitude of this marginal reaction, the larger is the bias, defined as the distance
between the message sent m and the actual state s. In consequence, every shift in marginal
demand, e.g. when some receivers react to strategically valueable information such as disclosed
COIs, increases the sender’s bias.
To examine this general effect in more detail, I will henceforth assume the specific loss func-
tion K(m, s) = −12(m−s)2. This function is chosen because it captures the above considerations
and proxies well for lying costs which originate from social preferences, moral concerns against
lying, or reputational concerns in a stage version of a repeated game.12 Second, the above condi-
tions show that its size, relative to the sender’s lying costs, can be adjusted simply by choosing c
and its distribution accordingly. Finally, this restriction of its form allows a tractable analysis in
closed form and therefore increased clarity. The main reason for this is that the above first-order
condition simplifies to the following, intuitive form where the sender adds a bias to the actual
state of the world:
m∗ = s+ cD′(m∗) (4)
Note that the sender’s bias cD′(m) and the state of the world s enter the sender’s strategy
additively and separately. They can however be correlated in terms of the data-generating
process. The following describes this underlying informational setting, including scenarios in
which a non-zero correlation between s and c matters in more detail.
Information: Both, the state of the world s and the sender’s COI c are his private information.
They are assumed to be a drawn from an elliptical distribution F with support equal to K×S =
R2. The standard example is the (multivariate) normal distribution. Other examples include
the heavier-tailed logistic or student-t distribution, often used in financial and risk modeling13,
as well as distributions with compact support, such as the uniform distribution. For the sake of
simplicity and without much loss of generality, I however maintain the assumption of unbounded
support.14 Three properties of elliptical distributions will be important in the present context:
12 When L is also quadratic, this cost function captures concerns for the utility of a receiver who follow the
sender’s message at face value. Kartik (2009) uses this specific form of costs as a prominent example for capturing
costs of lying per se. Reputational concerns can also be proxied by it: If the actual value of s became knowledge
ex-post, the squared distance of s and m is part of the nominator of the sender’s coefficient of determination
(R2) which one would obtain by regressing the state of the world on his prior messages; the sender credulity is
thus decreasing in this squared distance.
13See Embrechts et al. (2002), also for the potential caveats of doing so.
14Note that by choosing the distribution’s parameters appropriately, the probability that its realizations are
within some compact set can be made arbitrarily high. To see an example how the uniform distribution can be
gnerated from the general definition of elliptical distributions see the survey by Gómez et al. (2003), pp. 359/360
and for a related application of elliptical distribution with compact support, see Kartik and Frankel (2016). The
additional assumptions which are, in some cases, necessary to maintain all results presented here are essentially
to specify out-off-equilibrium beliefs; an issue which is bypassed under unbounded support.
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E1) Elliptically distributed random variables are closed under linear transformations, i.e. a
linear transformation of jointly F -distributed variables is itself F -distributed.
E2) A random variable, conditional on the realization of another random variable, both being
jointly elliptically distributed according to F (η,Σ), is also distributed according to F . The
vector of expected values and the variance-covariance matrix of the resulting conditional
distribution are linear transformations of η and Σ.
E3) Elliptical distributions are symmetric around their vector of expected values.
A more formal statement of these properties, together with a precise definition of elliptical
distributions and references can be found in the appendix. A specific elliptical distribution
F such as the normal one from which the sender type (s, c) is drawn can be parametrized by
denoting it F (η,Σ). The finite and real-valued vectors η and Σ represent the vector of expected










When appropriate, I will refer to correlation of s and c instead of its covariance σsc. To make
things interesting, I assume it not to be perfect, i.e. |Corr[s, c]| = |σsc|σsσc < 1. For the same
reason, I assume that the diagonal elements of Σ are strictly positive. Otherwise, the receiver’s
inference problem would effectively become one-dimensional or vanish entirely.
The above information structure is suited to naturally model how players, in particular
rational receivers, arrive at their prior. First, assuming unbounded support for (s, c) means that
no commonly known bounds on the state space are required. In contrast, assuming compact
support implies mutual understanding on such sharp bounds. Sometimes, this is straightforward
and reasonable, e.g. when the sender communicates on how much of one’s wealth should be
invested into a certain asset. However, once leverages become available or when s reflects asset
returns, appropriate bounds are not so clear-cut. A solution to this is then to assume that all
real values are theoretically possible while "unrealistic" or "unreasonable" extreme realizations
receive appropriately low probabilities by choosing the above moment parameters accordingly.
Another situation which is captured by this framework is when past information is used, e.g. by
using (4) as a structural model to arrive at a prior. Resulting estimates of (s, c) are then, by
the central limit theorem, approximately normally distributed.
As an import feature, this framework allows to handle the case of σsc 6= 0, e.g. when the
COI is dependent on the state of the world. As an example, consider a financial analyst or a
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manager who reports on an asset for which he holds call-options. By inducing a high demand he
can potentially raise the asset’s price such that it exceeds the option’s strike price. This would
then allow him to earn on the option. However, this only works if the fundamental value of the
asset represented by s is high enough such that he can "bridge" the distance necessary to meet
the option’s strike price via the effect his message has on demand. If this is not feasible, thus
when s is sufficient low, then there is essentially no COI. In consequence, s and c are positively
correlated. If the sender owns the asset himself, a negative correlation can follow. The reason
is that when the asset has low value, he wants to get rid of it. Before selling the asset, he then
faces a COI to bias his report upwards as to increase demand and thereby the sale price he
earns.15
Rational and naive receivers: I will now turn to the demand side and analyse reactions to
the sender’s message in detail. From (3) one gets that COIs induce the sender to not report
truthfully. How should receivers then take such a distortion into account and how in turn? A
receiver who rational, in a Bayesian sense, should do so by basing her action on the information
she can extract from the sender’s message such that it maximizes her expected utility:
dr(m) ≡ argmaxd∈SE[L(s, d)|m] (5)
In the case of a quadratic loss function, this is is clearly the conditional expectation of s given
m. The following result, due to Deimen and Szalay (2014), shows that this generalizes to the
strictly concave, symmetric loss function L when the message m is elliptically distributed:
Lemma 1. Suppose m is elliptically distributed. It then holds that dr(m) = E[s|m].
Proof. the proof adapts the proof of part i) of lemma 2 in Deimen and Szalay (2014) to this
paper’s setup and can be found in the appendix.
The optimal decision dr(m) is that of fully rational, Bayesian receiver who is capable of adjusting
the effect of the sender’s bias on his message and connecting it to the common prior. While some
receivers, e.g. institutional ones, can act in such a manner, empirical evidence shows that many
15Another scenario which is noteworthy to be mentioned and which can be easily captured in the framework
is scientific fraud: First, the reactions to empirical research are strongly based on test statistics with elliptical
distributions, for example normally or student-t-distributed regression coefficients. Second, outright cheating
such as making up data or more subtle techniques such as selective sampling and data mining are methods
with which these test statistics are manipulated (Fanelli, 2009; Steen, 2011; Simonsohn, 2014). However, ethical
concerns as well as reputation and legal sanctions create costs of doing so. Third, COIs to influence decisions
based on these statistics are common as they map one-to-one into statistical significance. Pressure to publish
and publication bias towards statistically significant results then create an incentive to use the above methods
in order to inflate test statistics (Simmons et al., 2011). Incentives to decrease such statistics do also exist, e.g.
in an antitrust case where the decisive measure is a company’s market share and the researcher is affiliated with
that company. Finally, disclosure policies are employed in this context, e.g. by many journals. In consequence,
the above framework can be applied to study their consequences.
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people do not anticipate and correct for others’ strategic behavior or ignore information which
is crucial from a strategic perspective (e.g. Brown et al., 2012; Brocas et al., 2014). In line with
such reasoning, Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) show that small investors such as private
households follow analysts’ optimistic recommendation more closely than bigger, institutional
ones who are more cautious to biases in messages. To capture these observations, I allow for the
possibility that there are naive receivers who take the sender’s signal at face value. Their action
is thus given by dn(m) = m, as in Ottaviani and Squintani (2006), Kartik et al. (2007) or Chen
(2011). I denote the share of naive or delegating receivers by µ ∈ [0, 1).16 The mass of rational
receivers is therefore given by 1−µ which yields the following expected demand function for the
receiver:
D(m) = µm+ (1− µ)dr(m) (6)
Note that whenever I will henceforth talk of naive receivers, their behavior is to receivers who
strategically equivalent to delegating the decision d to the sender. For example, in a financial
context delegation occurs when investors give their money to an actively managed fund either
because they are not allowed to trade certain kind of risky assets on their own and/or because
they want their money to be in the (seemingly) "good hands" of an expert (Gennaioli et al.,
2015). Also, fully rationally de-biasing a sender’s message requires effort and extra information.
If the stakes are small, relative to these informational costs, receivers may even rationally prefer
delegate to a biased expert (Sims, 2003). Finally, note that the above description also captures
a scenario in which a risk-neutral sender faces a single receiver but does not know whether this
receiver is naive or rational. Denoting the probability for the former case with µ and for the
latter with 1− µ, the expected demand for the sender would then be the same.
3 Undisclosed conflicts of interest
The communication game with undisclosed commissions has the following timing:
1) the sender’s type (s, c) is draw from F and privately observed by the sender,
2) the sender sends a signal m about s,
3) receivers observe m, if rational update their belief about s, then choose d,
4) payoffs are realized.
16By appropriate scaling of µ, one can always account for situations where naive or delegating receivers do
not react one-to-one, e.g. when dn(m) is a positive affine transformation with d′n(m) = r > 0. As an example,
suppose that there is a mass 0.5 of naive receivers who follow the signal, on average, in proportion r = 0.6. From
the sender’s point of view, this is the same as if there were a mass 0.2 of receivers who ignore him, mass 0.3 of
naives who follow one-to-one, and a mass 0.5 of rational receivers. Using µ = 0.3
0.8
would then be strategically
equivalent.
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I look for a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this game. It consists of a pair of equilibrium
strategies m∗ : S×C →M for the sender and d∗r : M → S for a rational receiver such that each
player’s expected utility is maximized, given the other players’ strategy when their beliefs are
formed by Bayes’ rule. Naive receivers are assumed to have a dominant strategy of following
the sender, their beliefs therefore do not matter. The key equilibrium belief in this context is
a rational receiver’s belief about s, denoted E[s|m∗] ≡ E[s|m]|m=m∗(s,c). This is the conditional
expectation of s given an imagem which is formed by the sender’s equilibrium messaging strategy
m∗(s, c).17
I will use this equilibrium concept under different settings of common knowledge, hence-
forth called information structures I. The information structure of the game with undisclosed
incentives is given by IU = {F (η,Σ), µ}, the game’s fundamental parameters and their joint
distribution. If commissions are disclosed, I will denote this information structure ID and will
later specify it more exactly. Whenever I use the expectations operator or terms based on it
such as variance or covariance, it is with respect to the respective information structure. For
example, E[c] = c¯ when I = IU but this will not hold with disclosed COIs (see next section).
Rational receivers maximize their expected utility by choosing dr(m). By assumption, naive
receivers choose dn(m) = m. From (6) one then gets the following expected utility for the
sender:
US(s, c,m) = c (µm+ (1− µ)dr(m))− 1
2
(m− s)2 (7)
The sender’s message directly affects the naive receivers’ demand and his lying cost. In addition,
it indirectly influences the rational receiver’s demand via its effect on dr(m). The optimal mes-
saging strategym∗(s, c) needs to weight these factors. Analogous to the definition of E[s|m∗] and
(5), I define a rational receiver’s optimal decision, given an image m of the sender’s equilibrium
messaging strategy m∗(s, c), as follows:
d∗r(m) ≡ argmaxd∈SE[L(d− s)|m]m=m∗(s,c)
In an equilibrium in which receivers’ reaction are differentiable with respected to the sender’s
message, his underlying equilibrium strategy then has to solve the following first-order condition
for every message m it generates:
m = s+ c
(
µ+ (1− µ)d∗r ′(m)
)
(8)
17Note that a complete belief profile over the sender’s type also requires to specify an analogously-defined
E[c|m]|m=m∗(s,c). Since this is however payoff-irrelevant for either player, I omit it for the sake of easier notation
and space.
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The expression d∗r ′(m) in the above denotes the marginal change in the action which maximizes
a rational receivers’ expected utility due to a change in the message when this is an image of the
equilibrium messaging strategy. The sender therefore has to take into account that the rational
receiver’s marginal reaction to the message does not rely only on the message sent but also on
the underlying messaging strategy. If for example, the equilibrium messaging strategy is very
uninformative, d∗r ′(m) should be relatively low. The sender thus trades off his incentive to bias
the signal in order to affect receiver’s decision with the loss in informativeness and therefore
their reaction to that message. In addition he also faces costs of lying. To derive how the sender
behaves optimally given these opposing incentives, I define the equilibrium inference coefficient
ρ∗ as a measure of the equilibrium strategy’s informativeness, i.e. how well variations in the







Throughout this paper, I will focus on the case that ρ∗ is a real, strictly positive number.
I therefore rule out completely uninformative messaging strategies in which the message m
and s do not co-vary. This happens, for example, when the sender always sends the same or a
completely random message, regardless of his type. It also means that messaging strategies which
generate a negative correlation of the message with the state of the world are not considered.
In such a situation, it would be common knowledge that the sender tells the opposite of what is
really going on – a feature which is unlikely to happen in an information market with experts.
Using this concept, one can show that in equilibrium, the inference coefficient has to be
equal to the marginal reaction of rational receivers’ to the message, thus that d∗r ′(m) = ρ∗ holds.
Proving this relationship constitutes the main building block for the following proposition which
characterizes the players’ equilibrium actions and the relevant equilibrium beliefs:
Proposition 1. Every pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the communication game
with strategies m∗(s, c) for the sender and d∗r(m) ∈ C2 for rational receivers takes the form of
m∗(s, c) = s+ c (µ+ (1− µ)ρ∗) (10)
d∗r(m) = (1− ρ∗)E[s] + ρ∗ (m− E[c](µ+ (1− µ)ρ∗)) (11)
The rational receivers equilibrium belief w.r.t. to s is given by E[s|m∗] = d∗r(m).
Proof. see appendix
The above result characterizes equilibria in which a rational receiver’s reaction to the sender’s
message is smooth in the sense that it is twice continuously differentiable. Note from (6) that
13
assuming a smooth strategy for rational receivers is a necessary condition for the overall demand
D(m) to be smooth. I focus on such smooth, pure strategy equilibria because it is sufficient
but yet relatively general to demonstrate the main point of this paper, the adverse effects of
disclosure. It also captures the idea that arbitrarily small changes in the sender’s message should
yield no large effect on demand.
In such equilibria, the sender’s action takes an intuitive form: The sender announces the state
of the world and adds a bias, given by m∗(s, c) − s = c (µ+ (1− µ)ρ∗). This bias equals the
marginal change in expected demand due to a change in the message, weighted with the sender’s
COI. Part of this expected demand is the rational receivers’ best response, his belief about s. It
consists of two parts: The first, weighted with 1− ρ∗, is their prior about the true state of the
world, given by E[s]. The other part of her inference is given by the received messagem corrected
for the expected bias E[c] (µ+ (1− µ)ρ∗). This part is weighted with ρ∗, the informativeness
of the message given the sender’s equilibrium strategy. In consequence, the marginal reaction
of rational receiver due to a change in the message is given by ρ∗. As it therefore affects the
the rational receiver’s reaction and thereby the sender’s bias, this equilibrium parameter will be
particularly important for the following analysis.
As a first step in this analysis, note that the correction by rational receivers for the expected
bias is based on the expected commission. It can thus be wrong in both, direction and magnitude.
This possible failure in rational receiver’s de-biasing of the message and her risk-aversion provides
the reason why she often does not react one-to-one to the corrected message. Whenever ρ∗ ∈
(0, 1) applies, a rational receiver strategically ignores the senders message and puts weight on
her prior such that information is left unused. For illustration, consider a situation where σ2s is
almost zero, thus almost no fundamental uncertainty exists: In this case, Cov[s,m∗] will also
be close to zero and so is ρ∗. This would imply that a rational receiver acts almost entirely
according to her prior E[s]. The reason is that the actual state of the world s is very close to
the prior in such a situation. Any variation in the signal can then only be due to the sender’s
bias. Just following E[s] is then optimal for the rational receiver since it brings her action very
close to the true state of the world. In equilibrium, the sender takes such low values of ρ∗ and
the receiver’s expected reaction into account by scaling down his bias. The ratioanle for this is
that if receivers do not react to the message anyhow, there is no reason to bias one’s message,
given that lying is costly.
Generally, lower values of ρ∗, thus a lower informativeness of the message, will lead to decrease
in the sender’s bias while higher informativeness increases it. Such reasoning is consistent with
interpreting the equilibrium inference coefficient as the coefficient from a linear regression of the
state of the world on the message: Both, a regression coefficient and ρ∗ describe the marginal
14
change in the conditional expectation of a dependent variable due to a marginal change in the
independent variable. The crucial difference is that in a regression, this refers to an exogenous
change while here, it is the change in the endogenously determined equilibrium message with
respect to a change in the state of the world.
Using the functional form as stated in proposition 1 for the messaging strategy can then be
used to solve for the equilibrium inference coefficient:
Proposition 2. In the above game with undisclosed commissions, the equilibrium inference
coefficient ρ∗U =
Cov[s,m∗]
Var[m∗] is a fixed point to
gU (ρ) =
σ2s + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ)σsc
σ2s + 2(µ+ (1− µ)ρ)σsc + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ)2σ2c
(12)
Any fixed point ρ∗U ∈ (0, 1] is unique while a fixed point ρ∗U > 1 is either unique or one of three
such points.
Proof. see appendix
The above result, together with proposition 1 completely describes the game’s equilibrium strate-
gies and beliefs. With the parameters contained in IU , precise expressions for the players’ actions
and relevant beliefs can be computed from these results. In addition, one can bound the inference
coefficient which crucially shapes such equilibria from more general features of the information
structure:
Lemma 2. A fixed point ρ∗U > 0 to (12) exists if and only if σsc > τ
∗ for some τ∗ < 0.
Proof. see appendix
As a direct consequence, the assumption of a positive equilibrium inference coefficient boils
down to assume that σsc is sufficiently large, i.e. larger than τ∗. From (11), the rational receiver’s
equilibrium reaction, one gets that a positive value of the inference coefficient means that her
action dr covaries with the sender’s message m which then in turn covaries with the state of the
world s. The above lemma thus links covariance between s and c, the games fundamental random
variables, to the covariance of s and actions induced by the game, the messages by senders and
the reaction by receivers. It shows that for any non-negative correlation between σsc, these latter
covariances are positive via a positive ρ∗U . However, even with a negative correlation σsc ∈ (τ∗, 0)
this is the case since the sender’s cost of lying prevent a negative correlation between equilibrium
messages and the state of the world.
Proposition 2 also shows that multiple equilibria can only arise when the equilibrium inference
coefficient is larger than one. The following result examines these cases in more detail and
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provides general conditions under which ρ∗U is above and below the value of one, a threshold
which will be important in the following analysis:
Lemma 3. Suppose ρ∗U > 0. Then ρ
∗
U 5 1 if and only if σsc = −σ2c .
Proof. see appendix
As with the preceding lemma, the result maps the game’s parameters into behavior and back.
It shows that whenever strategic uncertainty regarding the sender’s COI, as measured by σ2c , is
sufficiently high the rational receiver’s demand is a unique, strictly convex combination between
her prior and the sender’s message, corrected for the expected bias. Also note since the condition
is equivalent to Corr[s, c] = −σcσs , strategic uncertainty exceeding fundemental uncertainty (σc >
σs) or a positive correlation between these variables, are sufficient conditions for this to happen.
However, non-convex combinations are, in principle, possible. If σsc is contained in (τ∗,−σ2c ),
the above lemma implies that rational receivers "over-react" – a change in the sender’s message
induces a change in rational receiver’s demand greater than that original change in the message.
To understand how such over-reaction occurs in equilibrium note that such sufficiently negative
values of σsc imply that rational receivers expect the sender to have a relatively strong incentive
to push demand into a direction which is inversely related to the actual state of world s. However,
since σsc > τ∗ is also assumed to hold, it is not strong enough to induce a non-positive correlation
between the message and s. In equilibrium, rational receivers anticipate this positive correlation
between the message and the state of the world. They counteract the bias, which they expect
to be strong and opposing in direction to s, by over-reacting to the corrected message. Since
such correction involves correcting for the expected bias and receivers have concave utility, the
expected disutility caused by a possible miscorrection is the greater, the more likely extreme
values of c are. Thus, when the COI is too unpredictable relative to fundamental uncertainty,
i.e. when σ2c ≥ σ2s , over-reaction cannot occur. The limit to such expectation-based corrections
are also reached when σsc ≤ τ∗. In this case, the expected bias is so strong and opposed in
direction to s that the risk of mis-correction outweighs the benefits of over-reacting.
Figure 1 illustrates these findings. It depicts the equilibrium inference coefficient for possible
correlation between the state of the world and the sender’s COI. The three lines represent
different values of σ2s , higher ones representing larger variance. This ordering reflects that ceteris
paribus, higher variation in smeans that it explains more variation for a given messaging strategy
and therefore increases the inference drawn from a message, as measured by ρ∗U . Reflecting
the previous lemma, it also shows that for any positive correlations and when σ2c > σ2s , the
equilibrium inference coefficient is always contained in the unit interval. The left region of the







Figure 1: Stable, positive equilibrium equilibrium inference coefficients ρ∗U over Corr[s, c]
Parameters: µ = 0.5, σ2c = 1, and σ2s = 1/2/3 (bottom/middle/top line).
than one. The figure also portrays the normalized cut-off value τ∗/(σsσc) as a vertical line. For
values of Corr[s, c] below it, an equilibrium in which s and m∗ are positively correlated and in
which rational receivers follow the corrected message does not exist.
4 Disclosed conflicts of interests
The above results show that when the sender’s COI is his private knowledge, his equilibrium
message is biased. Naive receivers who do not account for this bias are deceived by the sender
and make wrong decisions. Rational receivers try to correct for the expected bias, but whenever
the sender’s COI differs from its expected value, thus almost surely, their following action is also
sub-optimal. A tentative remedy to this is that the sender has to disclose his COI. Disclosure of
COIs will be modeled through a signal c˜ about c which receivers observe before they make their
choice. The signal is given by c˜ = c +  where  is an uncorrelated error term which is jointly
distributed with (s, c) and has expected value of zero and finite variance σ2 ≥ 0. This variance
therefore measures the quality of this signal. When it is zero the signal is perfectly accurate
about the sender’s COI, a setting I will henceforth call full disclosure. Conversely, imperfect
disclosure describes situations where the signal error’s variance is positive. The timing in the
game with a disclosed COI is then as follows:
1a) the sender’s type and the signal error (s, c, ) are drawn,
1b) c˜ = c+  becomes common knowledge, (s, c) is privately observed by the sender,
2) the sender sends a signal m about s,
3) receivers observe m, if rational update their belief about s, then choose d,
4) payoffs are realized.
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The only difference to the case of undisclosed COIs is therefore the signal c˜ which allows rational
receivers to update their beliefs regarding the value of c. The procedure for this is similar to the
signal extraction from the sender’s message. The updated belief regarding c is a combination
between the receiver’s prior, given by c¯, and the signal c˜ with weight for the latter chosen
according to its precision. In analogy to the equilibrium inference coefficient one can define the
following measure for the signal’s informativeness:





∈ (0, 1] (13)
It reflects how much variation in c can be explained by the signal c˜ about it. Accordingly, ρc is
key for the distribution of the sender’s type, conditional on the received signal about his COI:
Lemma 4. The posterior distribution of (s, c | c˜ ) is given by F (ηˆ, Σˆ) with
ηˆ =
 s¯+ (σsc/σ2c )(c˜− c¯)ρc
c¯(1− ρc) + c˜ρc
 and Σˆ =
 σ2s (1− ρc(Corr[s, c])2) σsc(1− ρc)
σsc(1− ρc) σ2c (1− ρc)

Proof. see appendix
Note that if σsc is non-zero, the signal about the COI also affects the posterior moments
involving the state of the world s since the signal then also contains information about this
variable. In the special case of full disclosure, ρc = 1 applies and the updated expectation for
the COI equals the observed signal. Since this eliminates any uncertainty about c all second
moments which contain this variable will then also shrink to zero. The above however shows that
this effect of reducing uncertainty however applies to any signal about c and second moments
are generally decreasing in its precision 1/σ2 via its positive effect on the parameter ρc.
To see how these informational consequences of disclosure translate into strategic ones, note
that this new posterior distribution becomes common knowledge for senders and rational re-
ceivers. In the previously analyzed communication game with undisclosed COIs, all results
depended only on the information structure IU = {F (η,Σ), µ}. After c˜ has been observed
and processed, the new information structure is given by ID = {F (ηˆ, Σˆ, c˜), µ}. Recall that
expectations are with respect to the information structure, e.g. with disclosed COIs it holds
that E[c] = c¯(1− ρc) + c˜ρc. Given this, one can proceed analogously as for undisclosed COI to
determine equilibrium behavior by using ID instead of IU . In particular, proposition 1 applies
and the equilibrium messaging strategy is of the linear form of the state of the world plus an
endogenously determined bias. The equilibrium inference coefficient can then be determined
analogously to the case of undisclosed COIs:
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With full disclosure it is uniquely given by ρ∗D = 1, with imperfect disclosure as a fixed point to
gD(ρ) =
φσ2s + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ)σsc
φσ2s + 2(µ+ (1− µ)ρ)σsc + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ)2σ2c
(14)
where φ ≡ 1−ρc(Corr[s,c])2)1−ρc > 1.
Proof. see appendix
Together with proposition 1, this result completely characterizes equilibrium behavior in games
with disclosed COIs. It shows that existence of an equilibrium with a positive inference coefficient
under undisclosed COIs is sufficient to establish existence of a similiar equilibrium when COIs
are disclosed.
In the special case of full disclosure, the inference coefficient, and thereby the marginal
reaction of rational receivers to the sender’s message, is equal to one. The sender’s equilibrium
strategy is then given by m∗(s, c) = s+ c while rational receivers infer E[s|m, c˜] = m− c˜. Since
with full disclosure c˜ = c applies, rational receivers therefore infer and implement the true state
of the world and thus achieve maximum utility, the sender’s message is however still biased.
With imperfect disclosure, the equilibrium inference coefficient ρ∗D solves (14). The only
difference to the characterization of inference coefficients with undisclosed COIs as stated in (12)
is the additional term φ > 1 in fixed point expression’s nominator and denominator. Comparing
Σˆ to Σ, one can see that this ratio which φ represent measures how much strategic uncertainty
regarding the COI c remains after disclosure, relative to fundamental uncertainty regarding the
state of the world s. To illustrate this, consider a signal c˜ which is very uninformative, resulting
in ρc close to zero. Rational receivers infer equally few about either kind of uncertainty with
regard to s or c from such a signal, and their posterior almost equals the prior. This is refelcted
by the facvt that then, φ is close to one and ρ∗D is very close to ρ
∗
U as (12) and (14) are almost
the same terms. As the signal quality increases, so do ρC and φ which leads to different values
for the inference coefficient. However, φ > 1 implies that the direct effect on reducing strategic
uncertainty is always stronger than the signal’s effect on decreasing fundamental uncertainty.
As in the case of full disclosure, multiple fixed points ρ∗D to (14) can exists. The following
lemma describes them and how they relate to the possible values of ρ∗U :
Lemma 5. Suppose ρ∗U > 0 exists. For any information structure IU and any signal quality of
c˜, the following cases can occur:
a) When there is a (unique) ρ∗U ∈ (0, 1), there is a unique solution ρ∗D ∈ (ρ∗U , 1).






c) When there is a unique ρ∗U > 1, there is a unique solution ρ
∗
D ∈ (1, ρ∗U ).
d) When there are three values ρ∗U > 1, there are either a unique or three solutions ρ
∗
D:























To see the pattern which the above results reflects, first reconsider the case of full disclosure:
In this case, rational receivers can extract the true state from the sender’s message and react fully
to it, as captured by ρ∗D = 1 (the messaging strategy is thus biased but revealing). When ρ
∗
U > 1
applied before disclosure the inference shrinks towards one. When in contrast ρ∗U < 1 applied
before disclosure, it increases towards this threshold. The cases a) through c) of the above
proposition generalize this to the case of imperfect disclosure. Upon disclosure, the inference
coefficient moves either up or down, towards to a value of one. For the special case that it
equaled one with undisclosed COIs, remains at this value. Result d) then covers the case when
there are multiple equilibrium inference coefficients, and therefore multiple equilibria, before
disclosure. For the first subcase of d), the above pattern also goes through. Upon disclosure of
COI, the new, unique equilibrium inference coefficient is closer to one and smaller in magnitude
than those which existed before disclosure.
To treat the effect of disclosure in the other subcase, some definitions will be useful. First,
one can organize the possible equilibrium coefficients as follows:
Definition 1. Let ρ∗D,k and ρ
∗
U,k with k ∈ {1, 2, 3} denote the positive-valued fixed points to (12)
and (14), respectively, ordered by increasing value. In case that such a fixed point is unique, any
such ρ∗k denotes its value.
One can order these equilibria according to the stability of the solutions to the fixped point
expression from which they originate. For this, I use the fact that a fixed point to g(ρ) corre-
sponds to a solution of the function f(ρ) = 0 when f(ρ) = g(ρ)−ρ = 0. I then use the following
stability criterion:
Definition 2. Let g(ρ) be a continuously differentiable, real-valued function. A fixed point ρ∗k
to g(ρ) is called asymptotically stable if and only if f ′(ρ)|ρ=ρ∗k < 0 where f(ρ) = g(ρ)− ρ.
The above definition follows from the findings by Hirsch and Smale (1974), pp. 185-188.
Although originally a dynamic concept, asymptotic stability has a long history of being used in
the analysis of situations whose equilibrium originate from one-shot situations, e.g. for tâtonn-
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ment processes in (general) equilibrium and recently also in strategic communication setting.18
In particular, asymptotically stable fixed points converge back to their original value after any
sufficiently small perpetuation, are locally unique, and can be found by iterative procedures.
The following then relates this notion of asymptotically stable equilibrium inference coefficients
to the equilibria which they characterize:
Definition 3. Let the tupel E(ρ∗k) collect strategies and beliefs as specified in proposition 1 with
ρ∗k = ρ
∗
U(D) > 0 as described in proposition 2 (proposition 3) when I = IU (I = ID). E(ρ∗k) is
then called an asymptotically stable equilibrium if and only if the corresponding fiexed point ρ∗k
is asymptotically stable.
This notion allows to rank multiple equilibria, as characterized by their equilibrium, inference
coefficients according to their asymptotic stability:
Lemma 6. An equilibrium E(ρ∗k) is asymptotically stable if and only if k ∈ {1, 3}.
Proof. see appendix
The above, together with lemma 5 implies that the only unstable equilibrium is the medium-
valued one of out multiple equilibria when ρ∗U > 1, i.e. in case d) of the preceding proposition
5). All other equilibria are asymptotically stable. In consequence, the following can be stated:
Corollary 1. In any asymptotically stable equilibrium E(ρ∗k), the equilibrium coefficient strictly
increases (decreases) upon disclosure if and only if ρ∗U < 1 (ρ
∗
U > 1).
While trivial for all cases in proposition 5 when there is a unique equilibrium this also extends
this qualitative shift to the last sub-case. As a direct consequence of the preceding analysis,
there is a non-monotone effect of disclosure on the sender’s bias, via the equilibrium inference
coefficient. The following section explores this key effect of disclosure in more detail, in particular
how it affects the welfare of different receiver types and overall efficiency.
5 Consequences of disclosure
In the following, I will take a look on how the strategic changes which disclosure of COIs brings
to the above communication game affect receivers. For this, I will an ex-ante view on their
utility, thus before a draw of the sender’s type takes place. I start with naive receivers. They
18See Blume and Board (2014), p.869 who treat endogenously chosen vagueness in a one-shot communication
game and introduce the above stability concept for its analysis. They also provide references on how asymptotic
stability relates more generally to one-shot situations, in particular to Samuelson’s correspondence principle.
Adapted to the notation of this paper, they call fixed points with f ′(ρ)|ρ=ρ∗
k
< 0 "hyperbolically stable". This
terminology takes up Hirsch and Smale (1974) who call a fixed point "hyperbolic" when f ′(ρ)|ρ=ρ∗
k
6= 0 and who
also show that such points are either unstable or asymptotically stable, the latter only if f ′(ρ)|ρ=ρ∗
k
< 0, thus
leading to the definition used here
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are agnostic about the sender’s bias and do not account for the strategic change since for them,
d∗n(m) = m holds. Recall that receivers’ utility decreases in the distance of their decision and the
state of the world. Since the sender’s equilibrium strategy is to announce the state of the world
plus a bias, the argument of naive receivers’ utility then equals this bias, given by m∗(s, c)− s.
Their expected utility in equilibrium E(ρ∗k) is therefore equal to
E[uRn (E(ρ∗k))] = E[L(c(µ+ (1− µ)ρ∗)] = E[L(|c|(µ+ (1− µ)ρ∗)] < 0 (15)
where the second equality follows from the fact that only c can be non-positive, while L is
negatively valued and symmetric around its maximum of zero. The expected utility of naive
receivers therefore strictly decreases in ρ∗ and the following immediately emerges:
Corollary 2. Upon disclosure of COIs, the expected utility of naive receivers decreases (increases)
in every asymptotically stable equilibrium E(ρ∗k) if and only if ρU < 1 (ρU > 1).
This shows that in any stable solution to the communication game, naive receivers can only
benefit from disclosure when the equilibrium inference coefficient is larger than one, i.e. if none
of the conditions stated in lemma 3 is fulfilled. Otherwise, naive receivers suffer from disclosure.
To evaluate the overall effect of disclosure, one needs to also look on its effects for rational
receivers. These receivers correct for the expected bias and therefore implement what they infer
to be the expected state of the world. However, the risk of this implementation being wrong
yields (expected) disutility whose magnitude depends on the concavity of L and the volatility
of the sender’s bias. To obtain a tractable measure for rational receivers’ expected utility, one
can exploit the property E2 of elliptically distributed variables, the fact that they inherit their
distribution to linear combinations formed from them. In particular, it then follows from (10)
that the rational receiver’s decision error d∗r − s is elliptically distributed. Using an approach
similar to Meyer (1987), one can then show that this is sufficient to represent rational receivers’
expected utility as mean-variance preferences. This then admits the following representation of
rational receivers’ expected utility:
Lemma 7. The expected utility of rational receivers in equilibirum E(ρ∗k) is given by




1− (Corr[s,m]m=m∗(s,c))2]) ≤ 0
where L ∈ C obeys L′ (x) 5 0 for any x = 0. Furthermore, E[uRr (E(ρ∗k))] = 0 if and only if there
is full disclosure of the sender’s COI.
Proof. see appendix
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The lemma allows to represent the expected utility of rational receivers by a loss function with a
single argument. This argument only depends on the information structures and the equilibrium
inference coefficient derived from it. It is given by the fundamental uncertainty regarding σ2s ,
scaled down by the squared correlation of the state of the world with the sender’s equilibrium
message. Note that the empirical counterpart to this measure, the squared sample correlation of
s and m∗, equals the coefficient of determination ("R2"’) one would obtain if one regressed past
values of s on the sender’s message. In consequence, the more the sender’s message is correlated
with the variable it is supposed to report on, the better off are rational receivers.
This formulation of the sender’s expected utility helps in analyzing the opposing effects of dis-
closure: When ρ∗ increases upon disclosure, this reflects a greater informativeness of the sender’s
message. However, the sender strategically anticipates this and in turn, also increases his bias’
magnitude which makes the rational receivers’ inference more complicated again. Conversely,
when ρ∗ decreases, so does the bias. But does such a decrease in the inference coefficient then
not imply that also the message’s informativeness, and therefore the rational receivers’ utility,
decreases? Using the above lemma, the following result then shows that in both scenarios, the
net effect of disclosure on rational receivers’ expected utility is positive:
Proposition 4. Upon disclosure of COIs, the expected utility of rational receivers increases in
every asymptotically stable equilibrium E(ρ∗k).
Proof. see appendix
While this is good news from the perspective of rational receivers, the following results imme-
diately follows from the preceding ones. It shows that disclosure often requires to trade off the
expected utility of naive receivers against the expected utility of rational ones:
Corollary 3. In any asymptotically stable equilibrium E(ρ∗k), disclosure of COIs is a Pareto-
improvement among receivers if and only if ρ∗U ≥ 1.
Thus, only when the inference coefficient is at least one, then all receivers benefit from disclosure.
If this is not the case, e.g. when any of the conditions in lemma 3 apply, naive receivers will suffer
from disclosure and judging disclosure by a Pareto-criterion with regards to their welfare then
forbids it. A policy maker who can influence disclosure and the quality of disclosed information
may want to resort to other criteria such as efficiency in this case. I capture such an efficienty
criterion by assuming that a policy maker wants to maximize a welfare function of the following
form where the weights wn and wr are assumed to be positive, wK to be non-negative:
W (E(ρ∗k)) = wn · E[uRn (E(ρ∗k))] + wr · E[uRr (E(ρ∗k))]− wK · E[(c(µ+ ρ∗k(1− µ)))2] (16)
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In the above, the first two terms capture the expected utility of naive and rational receivers,
respectively. The third term allows to capture the sender’s expected cost of lying E[K(m; s)].19
A straightforward choice is to choose weights according to the respective population shares, i.e.
wn = µ, wr = 1−µ, and no regards for the sender’s lying costs, thus wk = 0. Other weights can
capture further considerations: If Bayesian inference and the steps involved therein are costly
for rational receivers, a fully informative but biased message is not optimal. In face of such
de-biasing costs, only a truthful, unbiased message would be optimal. A choice wn > µ would
then reflect the relative importance of these costs, relative to the pure informational content of
the sender’s message and in addition to its effect on naive receivers. Setting wK > 0 allows to
capture when the sender’s expected costs of lying are relevant for a policy maker.20
Generally, the exact decision of whether disclosure should occur and how precise it should be
can only be answered when specific weights and utility functions are assumed. However, some
policy-relevant statements with respect to the effect of disclosure on W can be made even when
the exact values of these parameters are unknown:
Proposition 5. Full disclosure never (always) maximizes social welfare W in an asymptotically
stable equilibrium E(ρ∗k) when ρ∗U < 1 (ρ∗U ≥ 1).
Proof. see appendix
The second statement follow directly from the previous corollary. The first result, when ρ∗U < 1,
follows from the fact that receivers have strictly concave utility. They can achieve maximum
utility only with full disclosure (see lemma 7). When, near this optimum, some noise is added
to the signal c˜ the resulting loss is then, due to their concave utility, always smaller than the
gain in expected utility this induces for naive receivers via the associated decrease in ρ∗. Note
that while full disclosure is often not optimal, the reverse reasoning does not work and no or
imperfect disclosure can be optimal, in a second-best sense. Determining precise criteria for this
however requires more specific assumptions on the informational environment and preferences.
An example when no disclosure is best is contained in the appendix.
The preceding results show that the consequences of disclosing COIs depend crucially on
whether ρ∗U is above or below the threshold of one. Besides computing this value via (12),
lemma 3 allows to determine this directly from the second moments of the prior about the
sender’s type. However, even knowledge of these parameters is not necessary either for an
19Commissions paid are transfers from a third party to the sender, thus they should not matter for welfare.
20Apart from a welfare function which take into account the lying costs per se, such costs may also matter from
a policy point of view when they represent a reduced form of the sender’s reputation. This becomes economically
relevant when the loss in the sender’s credulity impedes his economic function of information elicitation and
dissemination. Alternatively, if the sender’s cost of lying come from a situation where he has to invest own funds,
e.g. own equity, according to his advice, these costs then reflect the cost of such mis-allocated capital.
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outside observer to yield testable predictions and to make informed decisions. One only needs
to observe how receivers react, on the aggregate level, to messages by a receivers. The reason for
this is that when naive receivers follow the receiver literally, it follows from (6) that ρ∗D > 1 is
equivalent to D′(m) > 1. Thus, when receivers react stronger than one-to-one to a change in the
sender’s message, full disclosure is optimal and will benefits all receivers. Conversely, observing
less than one-to-one reactions implies that upon disclosure, naive receivers will be hurt and that
full disclosure is not optimal from the point of maximizing welfare.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I describe a setting where an expert communicates the value of a random variable
of interest to uninformed receivers. He does so while he faces a conflict of interest to manipulate
the receivers’ actions. I show how, in equilibrium, rational receivers discount for the bias which
such a conflict creates in the expert’s message, even when they do not the aconflict of interest’s
magnitude or direction. I also show how in turn the sender adjusts to this correction. Crucially,
the model also allows for of naive or delegating receivers who ignore these effects and how their
presence enters the sender’s messaging and the rational receivers’ discounting strategy. This
model then provides a parsimonious framework for studying the effect of disclosing the sender’s
COI via a signal of arbitrary precision within a wide class of distributions and general levels of
the receivers’ risk aversion.
I find that disclosure fulfills the aim of informing rational receivers: Information about the
source of the sender’s bias helps them to learn more from the sender’s biased message and to
adjust their actions more closely to the state of the world. On the downside however, this
paper’s core result shows that exactly this desired effect of disclosure backfires on naive or
delegating receivers. It does so because in equilibrium, the average reaction to the biased signal
and the sender’s bias are mutually dependent. Upon disclosure, as rational receivers get helpful
information to de-bias the sender’s message, their reaction to the sender’s message often increases
and so does the bias contained in this message. Naive receivers who do not account for this are
then hurt by disclosure. Disclosure then amplifies a negative externality which rational receivers
exert on their naive peers. It therefore hurts those which are most vulnerable to strategic biases.
It is also more precisely determined when and how these adverse effects of disclosure manifest:
In terms of economic fundamentals, this is always the case when the state of the world and the
sender’s conflict of interest are weakly positively correlated. Another sufficient condition for
disclosure to backfire is when strategic uncertainty regarding the sender’s motives for biasing
his statements exceeds fundamental uncertainty regarding the variable which describes the state
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of the world. In terms of observed behavior, this happens when an expert’s message does not
induce at least an equivalent, e.g. one-to-one, average reaction among the different kinds of
receivers. Only when they react stronger than one-to-one to changes in the sender’s message,
then disclosure is an improvement among all, rational and naive, receivers. This is also the only
case when full disclosure is optimal from an efficiency point of view. In all other cases, a less
than perfect signal about the sender’s COI, potentially even an uninformative one, is optimal
for maximizing efficiency.
The results presented here show that when some people do not have the ability or the
information and time to act in a completely Bayesian and rational manner, disclosure often
hurts. Merely communicating a conflicts of interest by experts does then not solve the problems
which arise from it. In consequence, disclosure is not the regulatory panacea it promises to be,
at least on first sight. The remedy to the adverse effects of conflicts of interests is therefore to
eliminate them, rather than to just announcing them.
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Appendix
Features of elliptically distributed random variables
The following definition is obtained from definition 1 in the survey on elliptical distributions by
Gómez et al. (2003) and Theorem 4 ii) therein:
Definition: A random vector x ∈ Rn is elliptically distributed with expected value η ∈
Rn, positive definite variance-covariance matrix Σ ∈ Rn×n, and the Lebesque-measurable
function g : [0,∞) → [0,∞) s.t. ∫∞0 tn2−1g(t)dt < ∞ as parameters, if it has the density
function
f(x;η, Σ˜, g) = cn|Σ˜|− 12 g
(
(x− η)T Σ˜−1(x− η)
)











, and Σ˜ ∝ Σ.
The exact form of the distribution therefore depends on the density generator g. In the context
of this paper it is assumed to be implicitly defined by the by the specific elliptical distribution
F which is used. The generic example is when F denotes the (multivariate) normal distribution
which would imply that g(t) = exp
(−12 t). Other examples include the mutivariate logistic,
student-t or power exponential families of distributions.
The results in this paper do not depend on the specific distribution F as long as it is elliptical,
but just on its first two moments, η and Σ. To illustrate them, consider a random vector x ∈ Rn
with n ≥ 2 which is elliptically distributed according to F (η,Σ). Also consider two non-empty
partitions [x1,x2] of this vector. Partition analogously the corresponding vector of expected
values as η = (η1,η2) and the variance-covariance matrix Σ into blocks (Σ11,Σ12,Σ21,Σ22).
Then, the following properties hold for x:
E1: linear combinations of elements of x are distributed according to F
E2: (x2|x1) is distributed according to
F (η2 + Σ21Σ
−1
11 (x1 − η1),Σ22 −Σ21Σ−111 Σ12)
E3: x is symmetrically distributed around η
E3 follows from the above density function. Properties E1 and E2 are consequences of Theorem 5
and Theorem 8, respectively in Gómez et al. (2003) which also contains further references on the
original research establishing these properties for elliptical distributions. The three statements
about elliptical distributions in section 3 then reflect the above properties. It will be useful to
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Proof of Lemma 1
When m is distributed according to F , it is jointly elliptically distributed with s. By E2, the
resulting distribution of s conditional on m, denoted by its pdf f(s|m), is then also elliptical.
Furthermore, E3 implies that f(s|m) is symmetric around E[s|m]. By definition, it then has to
hold that dr = argmaxd∈S
∫
R L(d − s)f(s|m)ds. The necessary FOC for a candidate solution








and is also sufficient as L is strictly concave. To verify that this FOC applies for this candidate
solution note that by being strictly concave, L is single peaked and symmetric around its bliss
point s. Let ∆ ≤ 0 be the absolute deviation of the candidate solution from the optimal choice,
i.e. ∆ = |dr − s|. By symmetry of L around zero it holds that L′(∆) = −L′(−∆). Since f(s|m)
is symmetric around E[s|m] = dr it then follows that
L′(∆)f(dr −∆|m]) = −L′(−∆)f(dr + ∆|m]) 5 0
for any ∆ = 0. Integrating over all ∆ ∈ R+ then validates that the above FOC actually holds.
Since L is single-peaked, it is also the only solution.
Proof of Proposition 1
The following proof constructs a pure strategy equilibrium when the implied demand D(m)
is twice continuously differentiable. To do so, it proceeds in three steps. Step 1 solves the
rational receiver’s problem to choose his optimal action given that the sender’s message contains
information about s. Step 2 determines how such signal extraction by rational receivers manifests
in equilibrium when the sender anticipates this process. Step 3 combines these results to obtain
equilibrium actions and beliefs.
Step 1: Consider a candidate equilibrium messaging strategy m˜(s, c) such that D(m) = µm+
(1 − µ)d˜r(m) with d˜r(m) ≡ argmaxd∈SE[L(d − s)|m]m=m˜(s,c) exists and is twice differentiable
w.r.t. m. By (8), m˜ has to solve m˜ = s + c(µ + (1 − µ)d˜∗r ′(m˜)). Note that given the message
m˜ and the candidate equilibrium messaging function d˜r, d˜′r(m˜) is a non-random image of the
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function d˜′r(m). The associated messaging function which yielded m˜ is thus given by
m˜(s, c) = s+ c(µ+ (1− µ)d˜′r(m˜))
By E1, it is elliptically distributed according to F .
Lemma 1 then implies that d˜r(m) = E[s|m]m=m˜(s,c). Using E2 then yields that for a given
equilibrium message m˜, it has to hold that
d˜r(m) = E[s] +
(




with expected value E[m]m=m˜(s,c) = E[s] + E[c](µ+ (1−µ)d˜′r(m) and the associated equilibrium
parameters Cov[s,m]m=m˜(s,c) and Var[m]m=m˜(s,c).






with ρ˜ ≡ Cov[s,m]m=m˜(s,c)Var[m]m=m˜(s,c) which is obtained by differentiating (17) w.r.t. m.
When d˜′r(m) = 0, it follows that d˜′r(m) = ρ˜ = 0. Similarly, if E[c] = 0, then d˜′r(m) = ρ˜. Now
suppose that ρ˜E[c] 6= 0. One then gets d˜′r(m) as the solution to the above differential equation
given by
















where K˜ is a constant of integration. This can be plugged into the sender’s expected utility (7)
to obtain the following expression for US(s, c,m)|m=m˜(s,c):
cµm+ c(1− µ)
[










To determine ξ, I start with the case that c > 0. In this case, US(s, c,m) is increasing in
E[s|m∗], the term above in square brackets. If ρ˜E[c] > 0 the sender’s expected utility decreases
exponentially in m while all other terms involving m are either linear or quadratic. If ξ < 0,
the sender would then maximize his expected utility by choosing m → −∞ and there is no
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equilibrium. Therefore, ξ ≥ 0 has to hold in this case for any equilibrium. For ξ > 0 however,
US(s, c,m) would be lower than with ξ = 0. Since ξ is part of the endogenous inference of the
sender’s signal, he will not send a signal which allows such an inference. It follows that with
c > 0 and ρE[c] > 0, only ξ = 0 can be the equilibrium integration factor.
Continue to suppose that c > 0 but now ρE[c] < 0 holds. Inverse to the the preceding
reasoning, E∗[s|m] now increases exponentially in m which implies a global maximum of the
sender’s expected utility at m → +∞ whenever ξ > 0. Thus, for an equilibrium, ξ ≤ 0 has
to hold. Also inverse to the above, any strictly negative value of ξ would decrease the sender’s
expected utility. Messaging strategies allowing such inference are therefore not chosen by the
sender and ξ = 0 holds in any equilibrium with c > 0 and ρE[c] < 0.
For the case that c < 0, US(s, c,m) is decreasing in E[s|m∗]. The same reasoning as for
the case of c > 0 but with reversed signs can then be repeated which rules out any ξ 6= 0 in
equilibrium when c < 0 and ρ˜E[c] 6= 0.
Eventually, when c = 0 the inference E[s|m] does not enter US(s, c,m) and therefore does
neither affect the sender’s action nor the receiver’s reaction to it and one can assume w.l.o.g.
ξ = 0. It therefore has to hold in any equilibrium that ξ = 0 and therefore d˜r(m) = ρ˜.
Step 3: Given the above, one can determine the integration constant
K˜ = E[s]− (E[s] + E[c] (µ+ (1− µ)ρ˜))ρ˜
by combining (17) and (18). Using ξ = 0 then allows to write (19) as
US(s, c,m) = mc (µ+ (1− µ))− 1
2
(m− s)2 + c(1− µ)K
It is then easily verified that the unique message which maximizes the above expression is given
by m = s + c (µ+ (1− µ)) ρ˜. In equilibrium, it thus holds that m∗(s, c) = s + c (µ+ (1− µ)ρ˜
with ρ∗ = ρ˜ = d∗r ′(m) =
Cov[s,m]m=m∗(s,c)
Var[m]m=m∗(s,c)
as stated in (10). Using ρ˜ = ρ∗, ξ = 0, and the
above expression for K˜ on (18) then yields the rational receivers belief and strategy as stated in
(11).
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Proof of Proposition 2, part 1
By using m∗(s, c) = s+ c(µ+ (1− µ)ρ) from proposition 1 and the definition of ρ∗ = Cov[s,m∗]Var[m∗] ,








E[(s− E[s])[(s− E[s]) + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ)(c− E[c])]]
E[((s− E[s]) + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ)(c− E[c]))2]
=
σ2s + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ)σsc
σ2s + 2(µ+ (1− µ)ρ)σsc + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ)2σ2c
(20)
which yields (12). It is useful to define for the above nominator and denominator, respectively
N(ρ) ≡ σ2s + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ)σsc
D(ρ) ≡ σ2s + 2(µ+ (1− µ)ρ)σsc + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ)2σ2c
For the rational function gU (ρ) ≡ N(ρ)/D(ρ) whose solutions yield ρ∗U , the following properties
then hold :
Property a) N(ρ)/D(ρ) is continuous with D(ρ) > 0 for all ρ ∈ R.
Proof: Since both, D(ρ) and N(ρ) are continuous in ρ, it is sufficient to show that D(ρ) > 0
always holds. Suppose to the contrary it would not. Rearranging D(ρ), this would requiere that







σ2s + 2µσsc + µ
2σ2c
(1− µ)2σ2c
has at least one real solution, thus that (a/2)2 − b ≥ 0 holds. Plugging in and rearranging, this











= 0+ if σsc ≥ 0
Proof: N(ρ) strictly decreases (weakly increases) linearly in ρ when σsc < 0 (σsc ≥ 0) and
therefore attains negative (positive) values for ρ large enough. From a), D(ρ) is strictly positive
and it grows quadratically in ρ. Therefore, for large values of ρ, the ratio N(ρ)/D(ρ) is negative
(positive) and arbitrarily close to zero.
Property c) N(ρ)D(ρ) has at most two extreme points.















· 2(σsc + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ)σ2c )
) (21)
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equal to zero. By a), the first factor is non-zero. Extreme points therefore have to solve
σscD(ρ) = N(ρ) · 2(σsc + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ)σ2c )
Plugging in the functions for N(ρ) and D(ρ) yields an equation which is quadratic in ρ and thus
has at most two real solutions.
Before I continue with the remaining part of the proof of proposition 2, I first proof lemma 2
and 3. While they are stated in the main text after proposition 2 for reasons of better exposure,
they only rely on properties proved so far.
Proof of Lemma 2
Necessitiy: By property a) as derived above it follows that for a fixed point ρ∗U which solves
gU (ρ
∗




U ) > 0, N(ρ
∗
U ) > 0 has to hold. This is equivalent to σsc > τ(ρ
∗
U ) where
τ(ρ) = −σ2s/(µ + (1 − µ)ρ) < 0 is defined for any ρ > −µ/(1 − µ). Note that τ ′(ρ) > 0 for all
ρ ≥ 0. For ρ∗U > 0 it therefore has to hold that σsc > τ∗ ≡ τ(ρ∗U ) with τ∗ < 0.
Sufficiency: To see that σsc > τ∗ is also sufficient for (12) to have a solution ρ∗U > 0, note
that by the above reasoning σsc > τ(ρ∗) > τ(0) holds and therefore, Cov[s,m∗]|ρ=0 = N(0) > 0
applies. Since Var[m∗]ρ=0 = D(0) > 0, it then follows that gU (0) = N(0)/D(0) > 0. Together
with continuity and a limit of zero of gU (ρ) as derived in properties a) and b) above, this means
that there has to be at least one fixed point, i.e. at least one intersection of gU (ρ) with the
45-degree line over R++.
Proof of Lemma 3
Necessitiy: By proposition (20) in the hitherto part of the proof of proposition 2, ρ∗U ≤ 1,
conditional on ρ∗U > 0, holds if and only if
σ2s + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ)σsc
σ2s + 2(µ+ (1− µ)ρ)σsc + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ)2σ2c
∣∣∣∣
ρ=ρ∗U
= ρ∗U ≤ 1 (22)
This condition simplifies to
σsc ≥ −(µ+ (1− µ)ρ∗U ))σ2c
The above inequality becomes more slack for higher, positive values of ρ∗U . Inserting ρ
∗
U = 1,
the upper bound on the desired value range, then yields σsc ≥ −σ2c as a necessary condition.
Sufficiency: To see that that this condition is also sufficient first note from (22) that for any
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σsc ≥ 0, ρ∗U ∈ (0, 1) follows immediately. Second, from the above reasoning follows immediately
that σsc = σ2c implies ρ∗U = 1. Now suppose σsc ∈ (−σ2c , 0), i.e. σ2c = −σscλ for some λ ∈ (0, 1).
To show that then, ρ∗U < 1 follows, suppose the opposite and substitute into (22) to get
σ2s + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ)σsc






Since the above denominator represents, in equilibrium, Var[m] = D(ρ) > 0 (see property a) in
the preceding proof), this simplifies to
0 ≥ (µ+ (1− µ)ρ)σsc ·
(




When σsc < 0, ρ = ρ∗U ≥ 1 and λ ∈ (0, 1) ought to hold this is a contradiction as then, both of
the above factors will be strictly negative.
Proof of Proposition 2, part 2
A solution ρ∗U to (12) requires an intersection of the 45-degree line and N(ρ)/D(ρ). Note
that every such fixed point has to be a root of the cubic equation k(ρ) = ρD(ρ) − N(ρ) =
Aρ3 +Bρ2 + Cρ+D = 0 with coefficients
A = (1− µ)2σ2c , B = 2(1− µ)(σsc + µσ2c ), C = σ2s + µ2σ2c + (3µ− 1)σsc, D = −σ2s − µσsc.
To examine multiplicity of such roots, I use the following result:
Theorem. (Descarte’s rule of signs) Consider a n-degree polynominal p(x) =
∑n
k=0 ck · xk with
real coefficients. Order the non-zero coefficients ck in an descending order of the exponent ok.
The number of positive, real roots of the polynomial is less by an even number or equal to the
number of sign changes between successive coefficients in this ordering.
It always holds that A > 0. Furthermore, by lemma 2, a solution ρU > 0 implies D < 0 because
−D = Cov[s,m∗]|ρ=0 = N(0) > 0. By the sign rule, the only configuration for more than one
sign change, given that A > 0 > D, is C > 0 > B. Thus, there are either one or three positive
roots corresponding to fixed points of gU (ρ).
Multiple fixed points therefore require B < 0, thus σsc < 0. Suppose they exist. By
property a) and b) derived in the first part of this proof, this means that gU (ρ) = N(ρ)/D(ρ)
continuously approaches zero from below when ρ becomes large enough. Also, it has been
shown that N(0)/D(0) > 0 (see proof of lemma 2). Together, this implies that gU has to have
36
a negatively valued local minimum on R++ denoted by ρ−, i.e. gU (ρ−) = N(ρ−)/D(ρ−) < 0. If
ρ− is the only extreme value over R++ this implies only one intersection with the 45-degree line,
thus a unique fixed point. If it is not the unique extreme value, by property c) derived in the
first part of the proof, there is exactly one other extreme value of gU over R++. It it has to be
a local maximum since ρ− is a local minimum. I denote its location ρ+. By property b) it then
has to hold that 0 < ρ+ < ρ−. Furthermore, since ρ+ is a local maximum and N(0)/D(0) > 0
it follows that gU (ρ+) = N(ρ+)/D(ρ+) > 0.
Accordingly gU (ρ) = N(ρ)/D(ρ) has to be non-increasing between its positively-valued local
maximum at ρ+ and itsnegatively-valued local minimum at ρ− < 0. It thus cut the 45-degree
line exactly only once in this interval. Because σsc < 0 was assumed, it approaches its limit of
zero from below on [ρ−,+∞) (see property b) in the first part of the proof), thus no intersection
with the 45-degree line can occur in this interval. Multiple, positively valued fixed points of
gU (ρ) number to three such such that their coordinates can be denoted w.l.o.g. by 0 < ρ∗U,1 <
ρ∗U,2 < ρ
∗
U,3. It then has to hold that
0 < ρ∗U,1 < ρ
∗
U,2 < ρ+ < ρ
∗
U,3 < ρ−
By property c), there is no further extreme point over [ρ∗U,1, ρ
∗
U,2] ⊂ (0, ρ+) while 0 < gU (0) <
gU (ρ+). It follows that gU (ρ) is non-decreasing on [ρ∗U,1, ρ
∗
U,2]. Three fixed points of gU (ρ) at
ρ∗U,1 < ρ
∗
U,2 and ρU,3 ∈ (ρ+, ρ−) then imply that gU (ρ) cuts the 45-degree line (which has slope
1) thrice according to the following pattern:
(N(ρ)/D(ρ))′|ρ=ρ∗U,3 < 0 < (N(ρ)/D(ρ))′|ρ=ρ∗U,1 < 1 < (N(ρ)/D(ρ))′|ρ=ρ∗U,2 (23)




U,1) has to hold, the









· (σsc − 2ρ∗U,1(σsc + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ∗U,1)σ2c )) > 0
For this to hold, σsc + (µ + (1 − µ)ρ∗U,1)σ2c < 0 is a necessary condition as ρ∗U,1 > 0 > σsc.
Multiplying by (µ+ (1− µ)ρ∗U,1) > 0 yields the equivalent necessary condition
(µ+ (1− µ)ρ∗U,1)σsc + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ∗U,1)2σ2c = D(ρ∗U,1)−N(ρ∗U,1) < 0
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as a necessary condition for multiple fixed points ρ∗U .
Proof of Lemma 4




















Using E1 of the properties of elliptical distributions, as stated in the beginning of this appendix,
establishes that c˜ = c +  is distributed according to F and so is the random vector (c˜, s, c).
Note that because  is independent and unbiased, Cov[s, c˜] = E[(s − E[s])(c +  − E[c])] =
E[(s− s¯)(c− c¯)] = σsc, Var[c˜] = E[(c+ − E[c])2] = E[(c+ − c¯)2] = σ2c + σ2 , and Cov[c, c˜] =

























Using E2 with the parameters from the above distribution then yields after some rearranging
the stated conditional moments for (s, c | c˜).
Proof of Proposition 3
Using again the equilibrium mappingm∗(s, c) from proposition 1, now with information structure
ID and the associated conditional distribution of (s, c | c˜), means that with disclosed COIs an








σ2s + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ)(1− ρc)σsc










σ2s + 2(µ+ (1− µ)ρ)σsc + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ)2σ2c
38
Under full disclosure, σ2 = 0 holds and ρc = 1 applies such that a unique solution ρ = ρ∗D = 1
follows from the second line. The last transformation assumes ρc 6= 1, i.e. σ2 > 0. Substituting
φ for (1 − ρc(Corr[s, c])2/(1 − ρc) then yields (14). For the remainder of the proof imperfect
disclosure with ρc ∈ (0, 1), thus φ > 1, is assumed.
In analogy to first part of the proof of proposition 2, one can then define gD(ρ) = N˜(ρ)/D˜(ρ)
with N˜(ρ) = φσ2s + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ)σsc > N(ρ) and D˜(ρ) = φσ2s + 2(µ+ (1− µ)ρ)σsc + (µ+ (1−
µ)ρ)2σ2c > D(ρ). It is easily verified that N˜(ρ)/D˜(ρ) inherits the properties a) through c) of
N(ρ)/D(ρ) stated in that proof. Continuing, one can prove, analogously to the proof of lemma
2, that a sufficient condition for ρ∗D > 0 to exists is given by the condition σsc > τ˜(ρ
∗
D) with
τ˜(ρ) = −φσ2s/(µ + (1 − µ)ρ). Existence of ρ∗U > 0 is equivalent to σsc > τ(ρ∗U ) (see proof of
lemma 2). It then follows that ρ∗U > 0 is sufficient for ρ
∗
D > 0 to exist, since this implies that
σsc > τ(ρ
∗
U ) and τ(ρ) = −σ2s/(µ+ (1− µ)ρ) > τ˜(ρ) = −φσ2s/(µ+ (1− µ)ρ) holds for any ρ > 0.
Similar to the second part of the the proof of proposition 2, where fixed points to gU (ρ)
were expressed as roots to k(ρ), one can define the cubic function k˜(ρ) = ρD˜(ρ) − N˜(ρ) =
A˜ρ3 + B˜ρ2 + C˜ρ+ D˜ = 0 with coefficients
A˜ = A > 0, B˜ = B, C˜ = φσ2s + µ
2σ2c + (3µ− 1)σsc > C, D˜ = −φσ2s − µσsc < D < 0
where A through D are defined as in the second part of the proof of proposition 2. Roots to
k˜(ρ) then correspond to fixed point of gD(ρ). Applying the sign rule again implies that there
are either one or three such roots.
Proof of Lemma 5
The proof uses the cubic function k˜ with coefficients A˜ through D˜ as defined in the proof of
proposition 3 above. Its roots denote fixed points to gD(ρ) as stated in (14). Similiarly, it
uses the cubic function k as defined with coefficients A through D in the second part of the
proof of proposition 2. The corresponding roots denote fixed points to gU (ρ) as stated in (12).
Furthermore, from proposition 2 that gU has either one or three fixed points, with solutions
ρ∗U ∈ (0, 1] being unique.
Given these prerequisites, note that k˜(0) = D˜ < k(0) = D < 0 and k˜′(ρ) = 3A˜ρ2 + B˜ρ+ C˜ >
k′(ρ) = 3Aρ2 + Bρ + C for all ρ ∈ R+. Furthermore, k˜(ρ) = k(ρ) if and only if ρ = 1. It
therefore holds that k(ρ) > k˜(ρ) for all ρ ∈ (0, 1) and k(ρ) < k˜(ρ) for all ρ > 1.
Taken together, the above means that if there is a (unique) root ρ∗U ∈ (0, 1) of k , there must
be a unique root k˜ on (ρ∗U , 1) and and if ρ
∗
U = 1, ρ
∗
D = 1 applies. To see that a root ρ
∗
D < 1 is
unique, one can repeat the same reasoning as in the second part of the proof of proposition 2 to
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show that multiple solutions requiere all of them to have a value larger than one. This proves
cases a) and b).
For case c), thus when there is a unique ρ∗U > 1, by proposition 2 and the above reasoning,
k˜(1) = k(1) < 0 has to hold. A unique root of k at ρ∗U > 1 implies that gU never cuts the real
line again on (ρ∗U ,+∞). Neither does k˜ since k˜(ρ) > k(ρ) for ρ > 1. This, in addition with
k˜(1) = k(1) < 0, however means also that k˜ cuts the real line once over (1, ρ∗U ) which proves
case c).
Now consider case d), i.e that there are three positively-valued fixed points to gU (ρ). By




U,3. The continuous, cubic
function k obeys k(0) = D < 0 (see the second part of the proof of proposition 2). This
implies that k cuts the real line from below at ρ∗U,1, from above at ρ
∗
U,2, and again from below
at ρ∗U,3. Since it is a continuous polynomial, it has to have a local maximum and minimum
in between these points. They are denoted by ρk− and ρk+, respectively. It thus holds that












a similarly-shaped polynomial by analogous reasoning. Therefore, k˜ cuts the real line from below
at ρ∗D,1, from above at ρ
∗
D,2, and from below at ρ
∗
D,3. From k˜(1) = k(1) < 0 and k˜(ρ) > k(ρ)
for ρ > 1, it follows that when k˜ cuts the real line from below (above), it has to do so at lower
(higher) values than k. For three roots of k˜, this implies that











which proves the second part of case d). If k˜ has only one root (two have been ruled out by the
sign rule), k˜(1) = k(1) < 0 and k˜(ρ) > k(ρ) again imply that it cuts the real line from below,







the first part of case d).
Proof of Lemma 6
Using the function f(ρ) = gU (ρ)− ρ as introduced in definition 2 to find fixed points to gU (ρ),
we can see that it is continuous and that f(0) = gU (0) = N(0)/D(0) > 0 holds (see the first
part of the proof of proposition 2). It follows that for f to have three roots, it has to cut the
real line from above at ρ∗U,1, from below at ρ
∗
U,2, and again from above at ρ
∗
U,3. This implies
f ′(ρ∗U,1) < 0, f
′(ρ∗U,2) > 0, and f





and that ρ∗U,2 is unstable.
For the case of undisclosed commissions one can repeat the above procedure by using gD(ρ) =
N˜(ρ)/D˜(ρ) with N˜(ρ) and D˜(ρ) as defined in the proof of proposition 3. In particular, when
40
ρ∗U > 0 exists, N˜(ρ) > N(ρ) > 0 holds for all ρ > 0. By the same reasoning, D˜(ρ) > D(ρ) > 0
applies such that gD(0) = N˜(0)/D˜(0) > 0. Preceding as above, one can then define f˜(ρ) =
gD(ρ)− ρ whose roots correspond to fixed points of gD(ρ) and for which f˜(0) = N˜(0)/D˜(0) > 0
applies. The above reasoning regarding the shape of f then applies analogously for f˜ and
therefore the statements of asymptotic stability and instability regarding its fixed points carry
over.
Proof of Lemma 7
The argument of the sender’s (expected) utility is given by
z ≡ d∗r(m)− s = (1− ρ∗)E[s] + ρ∗ [m∗(s, c)− E[c] (µ+ (1− µ)ρ∗)] − s
= −(s− E[s]) + ρ∗ [m∗(s, c)− E[s]− E[c] (µ+ (1− µ)ρ∗))]
= −(s− E[s]) + (m∗(s, c)− E[m∗(s, c)]) ρ∗
(24)
Note that by (10), m∗(s, c) is a linear transformation of the vector (s, c) and by E1, it is thus
distributed according to F . Similarly, s is also distributed according to F . In consequence, z is
distributed according to F (E[z],Var[z]). One can then normalize z via the linear transformation
zˆ(z) = z/
√
Var[z] − E[z] such that zˆ follows F (0, 1) whose probability density function will be

















From (24) it follows that E[z] = 0. One can thus define the univariate function L (Var[y]) ≡




































therefore, the above expression is non-positive. In addition, fˆ is symmetric around zero and
L′(Var[z]) = 0 if and only if Var[z] = 0. It has been shown in the main text that under full
disclosure, uRr (ρ∗, ·) = 0 holds since rational receivers can then extract s from the message and
implement their optimal choice. Full disclosure therefore implies L(0) = 0.
To see that full disclosure is also necessary for L(0) = 0 to hold, note from the above that
this requires Var[z] = 0 and therefore d∗r(m) = s. Suppose that this held under imperfect
disclosure. For d∗r(m) = s to apply in this case, (11) requires both ρ∗ = 1 and c = E[c] to hold
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simultaneously for any realization (s, c). The latter statement is a contradiction to the fact that
under imperfect disclosure with ρc ∈ (0, 1), Var[c|c˜] > 0 and Var[s|c˜] > 0 applies (see lemma 4).
To see the alternative representation of the argument x ≡ Var[z], note that by using the
definition of ρ∗ one gets the following:
x = Var[z] = Var[d∗r(m)− s]
= E[(−(s− E[s]) + (m∗(s, c)− E [m∗(s, c)])ρ∗)2]
= (σ2s − 2ρ∗Cov[s,m∗] + (ρ∗)2Var[m∗])
= σ2s − ρ∗Cov[s,m∗]
From the law of total variance and using again the definition of ρ∗, it also holds that
E [Var[s|m∗]] = Var[s]−Var[E[s|m∗]]
= σ2s − E[(d∗r(m)− E[s]])2]
= σ2s − E[((m∗ − E[m∗]) ρ∗)2]
= σ2s − (ρ∗)2Var[m∗]






1− Corr[s,m∗]2) ≥ 0







Proof of Proposition 4
Lemma 7 shows that the expected utility of rational receivers strictly increases in Corr[s,m∗]2.
For equilibria with ρ∗ > 0 and therefore Cov[s,m∗] > 0, it is then sufficient to show that













I first consider the case that 1 ≥ ρ∗D > ρ∗U > 0. According to (10) one gets
D(ρ∗) = Var[m∗] = Var[s+c(µ+(1−µ)ρ∗)] = Var[σ2s +2(µ+(1−µ)ρ∗)σsc+(µ+(1−µ)ρ∗)2σ2c ]
(26)
Since the first factor on the RHS of (25) increases upon disclosure, it is then sufficient to show
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that also D(ρ∗D) > D(ρ
∗
U ) holds. From the fact that σsc + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ∗U )σ2c > 0 is a necessary
and sufficient condition for ρ∗U ∈ (0, 1) (see proof of lemma 3) this then follows from
D′(ρ∗)|ρ∗=ρ∗U = 2(1− µ) ·
(
σsc + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ∗U )σ2c
)
> 0 (27)
Now consider the case of asymptotically stable equilibria with ρ∗U > 1. From lemma 5 and 6
it then follows that for such equilibria, 1 < ρ∗D < ρ
∗
U holds, thus disclosure decreases ρ
∗. To
show that Corr[s,m∗] does also increase upon disclosure in this case, I will use again that in
equilibrium ρ∗ = N(ρ∗)/D(ρ∗) holds with
N(ρ∗) = Cov[s,m∗(s, c)] = Cov[s, s+ c(µ+ (1− µ)ρ∗] = σ2s + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ∗)σsc (28)





























To determine the sign of the above, note that by multiplying it with
√
D(ρ∗) > 0 and using
ρ∗ = N(ρ∗)/D(ρ∗) again, its sign is given by
sgn
[







σsc − ρ∗U (σsc + (µ+ (1− µ)ρ∗U )σ2c )
]




U ) and this again with (28) and (26) then
yields after multiplying it by D(ρ∗U ) > 0 (and some transformations) that the sign of the above
equals
sgn[(σ2sc − σ2cσ2s)] = sgn
[
(Corr[s, c]2 − 1)] < 0
In consequence, a decrease in ρ∗ > 1 upon disclosure increases Corr[s,m∗(s, c)].
Finally, consider the case of ρ∗U = 1. By case c) in lemma 5, the inference coefficient then
remains constant upon disclosure. Furthermore, by lemma 3, it has to apply that σ2c = −σsc.
Proposition 1 then implies that E[s|m∗] = m∗(s, c) − E[c] = s + c − E[c]. From lemma 7 and
its proof, x = σ2s
(
1− Corr[s,m∗]2) = E[Var[s|m∗] is the argument of the loss function L which
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desribes that rational receivers expected utility. Applying again the law of total variance yields
E[Var[s|m∗] = Var[s]−Var[E[s|m∗]]
= Var[s]− E [(s+ c− E[c]− E[s+ c− E[c]])2]
= −2Cov[s, c]−Var[c] = σ2c
with undisclosed COIs. By analogous reasoning and using the posteriors from lemma 4 one
obtains for disclosed COIs, after the signal c˜ has been obtained, E[Var[s|m∗, c˜] = (1 − ρc)σ2c
With full or imperfect disclosure, ρc ∈ (0, 1] applies and the rational receiver’s expected utility
L strictly increases when its argument strictly decreases.
Proof of Proposition 5
I start with the case of wK = 0 and denote, with slight abuse of notation,W (σ2 ) ≡W (E(ρ∗D(σ2 , ·)))
via the analogously defined E[uRr (σ2 )] ≡ E[uRr (E(ρ∗D(σ2 , ·)))] and E[uRn (σ2 )] ≡ E[uRn (E(ρ∗D(σ2 , ·)))].
This reflects that in the case of disclosed COIs, the coefficient ρ∗D is the only term which con-
tains σ2 via the function φ (see proposition 3). Using N˜(ρ) and D˜(ρ) as defined in the proof of



































∂ρ∗ is positive (negative) if and only if ρ
∗
U > 1 (ρ
∗
U < 1) one then gets from (15) and



























= − sgn [ρ∗U − 1] (30)
When ρ∗U ∈ (0, 1), every decrease in σ2 therefore hurts naive receivers. In contrast, it has
been shown in the main text that when there is full disclosure, i.e. σ2 = 0, rational receivers
achieve their maximum utility, thus E[uRr (0)]′ = 0 holds. The first part of the statement then
follows from showing that when ρ∗U ∈ (0, 1), there exists a ∆ > 0 such that starting from full
disclosure with σ2 = 0, the gradual increase of this variance to σ2 = ∆ increases W (σ2 ) =
wr · E[uRr (σ2 ] + wn · E[uRn (σ2 )]. This is equivalent to showing that lim∆→0+ (W (∆)−W (0)) is
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= − sgn [ρ∗U − 1] > 0
The second-last equality in the above follows from the fact that by lemma 7, rational receivers








the last one follows from (30).
For the case that wK > 0, note that the above proof applies for any loss function uRn (σ2 ) =
L(σ2 ) which is strictly concave and symmetric around zero. It therefore also holds when in ad-
dition to E[uRn (σ2 )], positive weight is assigned to E[K(m, s)|m=m∗(s,c)] = −E[c(µ+ρ∗(σ2 , ·)(1−
µ))2]. This then yield the first part of the proposition.
The second statement is then an immediate consequence of the fact that when ρ∗U > 1,
according to (30) increasing the signal precision (decreasing σ2 > 0) helps naive receivers and
that full disclosure maximizes the utility of rational receivers (see lemma 7).
Example for non-disclosure to be optimal
As a concrete example for a scenario where non-disclosure is optimal, consider the parameters
σ2s = σ
2
c = 1, s¯ = c¯ = σsc = 0, together with µ = wn = wr = 0.5, wk = 0, and the loss function
L(d− s) = −(d− s)2. Plugging this into (12) and solving yields ρ∗U ≈ 0.6. Following lemma 5,
disclosure then increases the inference coefficient. Using proposition 1 and (16) yields
W = −0.5 (E[(ρ[m∗(s, c)− c¯(µ+ (1− µ)ρ)] + (1− ρ)s¯− s)2] + E[(m∗(s, c)− s)2]) ∣∣
ρ=ρ∗
= −0.5 (E[(ρm∗(s, c)− s)2] + E[(m∗(s, c)− s)2]) ∣∣
ρ=ρ∗




(ρ− 1)2E[s2] + 2(ρ− 1)ρ(0.5 + 0.5ρ)E[sc] + (ρ2 + 1)(0.5 + 0.5ρ)2E[c2]∣∣
ρ=ρ∗
= −0.5 ((ρ− 1)2 + (ρ2 + 1)(0.5 + 0.5ρ)2) ∣∣
ρ=ρ∗
which is easily verified to be strictly decreasing in ρ when ρ > 0.4. Therefore, non-disclosure
maximizes W.
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